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INTRODUCTION
Most courts, legislatures, and scholars agree that the widespread
movement over the past half-century toward aligning liability with fault has
positively influenced tort law;1 however, the change has not come without
difficulty.2 Courts and legislatures have struggled to determine how these
developing doctrines affect apportionment of damages in various contexts.3
This note addresses the issue of how damages should be apportioned among
multiple tortfeasors when an injured plaintiff has suffered a workplace
injury and the employer or a coworker is partially to blame. In certain
situations, workers’ compensation laws undercut the principles of
comparative fault by requiring a non-immune defendant to compensate an
injured worker greater than the defendant’s percentage of fault, while a
blameworthy but immune employer is reimbursed in full.4
An example illustrates the problem: Eddy Employee and Carl
Coworker work together at Employer Co. While on the job, Eddy is riding
as a passenger in a work vehicle driven by Carl, and they are involved in a
car wreck with Driver. As a result of the accident, Eddy is severely injured
and later receives $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits from
Employer Co. (likely paid by its workers’ compensation insurance carrier).
Eddy then sues Driver seeking $200,000 in damages. The crux of the
problem is that even if Carl was negligent in the operation of the vehicle as
a coworker he is given immunity from fault allocation under the workers’
compensation laws, as would the employer. Further, since Eddy was just a
passenger and did not in any way cause the car accident, there is no fault to
allege against him as the plaintiff.
In every state, workers’ compensation laws create an arrangement
where an employer pays limited benefits to an employee injured on the job
in exchange for the employer’s immunity to tort liability.5 This immunity
also extends to coworkers in the majority of states.6 As in the example
1. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL 3D § 1:2 (1995).
2. See generally Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative
Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103
(2002).
3. Andrew R. Klein, Apportionment of Liability in Workplace Injury Cases,
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 66 (2005).
4. Id. at 66–67.
5. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2014).
6. Id. § 111.03.
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above, however, another party may have contributed to the employee’s
harm. Under the traditional approach, used in the majority of states,
workers’ compensation laws also preclude consideration of an employer’s
fault in the context of litigation involving an injured employee against a
third-party defendant for a workplace injury,7 including the fault of any of
the employer’s employees.8 In neither situation can fault be allocated to the
employer or coworker for their negligence, so the only fault considered is
that of the plaintiff and the third-party defendant.9 Even if the coworker or
employer was substantially more at fault than the third-party defendant, the
jury cannot consider this in its fault allocation.10 Therefore, if at trial the
jury finds Driver to be at fault, no matter what the percentage, then Driver,
a non-immune defendant who was only partially at fault for Eddy’s injury,
will have to bear liability both for his own fault and that of Eddy’s
negligent coworker Carl.
Further, after the injured worker recovers from the third-party
defendant, the immune employer typically has the right to recover in
subrogation the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid to the
injured employee.11 It is said that the employer’s right to subrogation
ensures that the injured worker is not permitted to recover twice, through
both workers’ compensation benefits and a tort award, and it is generally
deemed justifiable when the employer is permitted to recover from the only
party to blame for the injury.12 But the right to recover through subrogation
exists regardless of whether the employer or one if its employees were at
fault.13 Thus, assuming Eddy prevails at establishing some fault of Driver
and recovers $200,000, Employer Co. (or its insurance carrier) has the right
to pursue its subrogation lien for the $20,000 that it paid previously in
workers’ compensation benefits. Since workers’ compensation laws permit
this, the employer recovers this amount regardless of the fact that its
employee Carl was also negligent and arguably should have shared in the
fault allocation.
This concerning result conflicts with the routine practice of courts,
which is to use prevalent comparative fault principles to make calculations
that align liability with fault. If courts are able to adjust damage awards
7. Id. § 120.02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ C20(a)(ii) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
8. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 121.09.
12. See, e.g., Struhs v. Protection Techs., Inc., 992 P.2d 164, 168 (Idaho 1999)
(quoting Presnell v. Kelly, 740 P.2d 43, 45 (Idaho 1987)) (“The dual purposes of
subrogation . . . are to achieve an equitable distribution between responsible parties ‘by
assuring that the discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and good
conscience ought to pay it’ and ‘to prevent the injured claimant from obtaining a double
recovery for an injury.’”).
13. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09 (2014).
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based on each tortfeasor’s contribution to the harm, then a nonimmune
third-party defendant should not be forced to compensate an injured
plaintiff greater than his percentage of fault and an employer should not be
fully reimbursed for workers’ compensation payments when the employer
or its employee was to blame for the harm. However, it must be considered
that the individual interests of three separate parties are at play. The law
must seek to accommodate the injured employee’s interest in full
compensation for his harm, the employer’s interests in limited liability and
subrogation, and the third-party defendant’s interest in a reduced liability
that is in proportion to his own fault. Although it appears that no perfect
solution is possible, a solution in which each of the parties bears a portion
of the burden of inequity created by the inability to neatly mesh workers’
compensation and tort law is attainable.
In support of this conclusion, Part I of this note describes the
background principles of comparative fault and workers’ compensation
law, which led to the problem of meshing the two systems in an injured
employee’s suit against a third-party defendant. Using the Eddy Employee
example from above as a guide, Part II examines the differing results
produced by existing approaches that address the concurrent negligence of
an employer or coworker, and Part III analyzes various solutions suggested
by scholars for the apportionment of liability in such workplace injury
cases. Finally, after considering these varied approaches, Part IV lays out a
new proposed solution, discusses the problems with the current approaches
and suggested solutions in light of widespread acceptance of the alignment
of fault and liability, and explains why the new proposal improves upon the
other approaches in this regard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Negligence Suits and Movement Towards Principles of Comparative
Fault
The central task of tort law is to remedy accidental harms,14 and the
tort of negligence is said to lie at the heart of civil liability,15 as most
accidents, professional malpractice, and personal injury cases, are governed
by the common law of negligence.16 While negligence law varies from state
to state, a plaintiff must generally prove the following elements: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty; (2) the defendant breached that
legal duty by behaving negligently; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual damage;
and (4) the defendant’s behavior was an actual and proximate cause of that

14. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 69 (1999).
15. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 45 (4th ed. 2010).
16. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 109.
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damage.17 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “negligence is
conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm,”18 and the Restatement (Third)
of Torts indicates that conduct is considered negligent if the actor does not
exercise reasonable care.19 Either definition may apply, but in all
jurisdictions the tort of negligence requires blameworthy conduct, or fault.20
Development of tort law has revolved, in part, around this concept of fault,
as the law tends to disfavor liability without fault, and specifically around
the apportionment of fault.21
When the conduct of multiple parties can be said to have caused a
particular indivisible harm, it creates the question of how to divide
responsibility for damages among the parties, including both plaintiffs and
defendants.22 An indivisible harm can be described as a single injury a
plaintiff sustains as a result of successive acts of negligence by more than
one tortfeasor.23 Each tortfeasor’s negligent act works together to bring
about the injury,24 such as when one driver who was speeding and another
who was sending a text message both crash into the plaintiff’s car.25 If the
plaintiff emerges with a back injury as a result of the combined impact, the
injury could be considered an indivisible harm.26 The rules of fault
apportionment, predominately developed over the past several decades,
address this issue.27 As discussed in the following sections, the vast
majority of jurisdictions now recognize at least some form of comparative
fault, which has made a major impact on existing common law methods of
apportionment, or the lack thereof.
1. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is a common affirmative defense to a
claim of negligence.28 In raising the defense of contributory negligence, the
defendant asserts that the plaintiff also behaved negligently, and, therefore,
17. Robert Cary, Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault Between
Negligent Parties in Minnesota–Daly v. McFarland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 275, 277
(2012).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 4, cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
20. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (2d ed. 2011).
21. See generally id. at § 487.
22. Id.
23. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 223.
24. Id.
25. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 20, at § 487.
26. Id.
27. Id. The rules of fault apportionment can be contrasted with causal apportionment,
which is applicable when multiple parties cause a divisible harm. Therefore, if there is an
evidentiary basis for causal apportionment, different rules may be applied by the court.
28. Cary, supra note 17, at 278.
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the plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced.29 Traditionally, contributory
negligence was treated as an all-or-nothing defense, meaning a plaintiff
could not recover from the defendant if the plaintiff was responsible for any
degree of the harm.30 This rule often led to particularly harsh results,
especially when the injured plaintiff’s own negligence was relatively
insignificant compared to the defendant’s negligent behavior.31
Nevertheless, those courts that were early adopters of contributory
negligence as a defense adhered to the belief that liability for a single,
indivisible injury must fall on one party or the other.32
Today, however, almost every jurisdiction has adopted a more
modern approach for apportioning damages between the plaintiff and
defendant, based on their proportionate shares of fault: comparative
negligence.33 This doctrine was introduced as a response to the traditional
contributory negligence rule,34 as courts began to shift the focus in
negligence suits toward compensating the injured plaintiff in the most just
way possible.35 Georgia led this slow movement by enacting a comparative
negligence statute in 1855, and by 1931, Mississippi and Wisconsin had
followed suit. Between 1969 and 1973, at least 20 more states had adopted
a form of comparative negligence by statute or judicial decision.36
Although administrative simplification arguments favor the
contributory negligence rule, the argument for comparative negligence was
ultimately deemed to be stronger, as 46 states now recognize some form of
comparative fault.37 Unlike contributory negligence, comparative fault is
29. Id. at 279.
30. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:1.
31. Cary, supra note 17, at 280.
32. Id. (citing Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862)) (“The reason why, in cases of
mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the other, is . . .
that the law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff’s
own fault.”).
33. See generally COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 2:4–2:6. The term
comparative fault typically encompasses both the concept of comparative negligence and
comparative fault, which are often used interchangeably. Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry
J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in Tennessee: Where Are We Going, and Why Are We in this
Handbasket?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 765, n.6 (2000). Both terms describe methods of allocating
damages based on each party’s fault for the injury; however, comparative negligence
specifically refers to the measure of the plaintiff’s negligence used for the purpose of
reducing the plaintiff’s recovery from the defendant, while comparative fault specifically
refers to the determination of how to apportion damages among multiple defendants
according to the percentage of fault attributed to each. Id.
34. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:1.
35. Cary, supra note 17, at 281.
36. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 211.
37. Id. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia
still recognize the traditional contributory negligence rule. Contributory
Negligence/Comparative Fault Laws in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER,
S.C. 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.mwl-law.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/contributory-negligence-comparative-fault-laws-in-all-50states.pdf [perma.cc/F52M-ZKPL].
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based on the rationale that each party should bear the financial
responsibility for their own failure to exercise ordinary care under the
circumstances.38 It also rests on the assumption that the old “all-or-nothing”
rule is unjust because it requires a negligent plaintiff to bear the full burden
of loss, even if the defendant’s conduct was far more blameworthy.39 In
contrast, the comparative fault rule gives neither the negligent plaintiff nor
the lucky defendant a free pass for failing to exercise due care.40
As the doctrine of comparative fault developed, two distinct
approaches to allocating liability emerged: pure comparative fault and
modified comparative fault.41 In a jurisdiction following pure comparative
fault, which is the simplest form of comparative fault, damages are reduced
strictly in proportion to the plaintiff’s own responsibility for his or her own
injury.42 Thus, the jury determines the percentage of fault for both the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced in
proportion to the plaintiff’s own fault.43 This is true regardless of the
plaintiff’s degree of fault.44 A plaintiff who is primarily at fault may still
recover from a defendant who was less at fault.45 Twelve states follow this
system.46
In order to avoid situations in which a severely negligent plaintiff
would be permitted to recover against a slightly negligent defendant, most
states have adopted a modified comparative fault approach.47 Under a
modified approach, damages are similarly reduced in proportion to the
plaintiff’s own percentage of fault, but recovery is not permitted if the
plaintiff’s negligence exceeds a certain percentage.48 Therefore, the plaintiff
is required to prove that his degree of fault is below the fixed threshold
before he can recover.49 In 11 states, the jury must determine the plaintiff
38. Jay M. Allen, Damage Apportionment In Accounting Malpractice Actions: The
Role Of Comparative Fault, 1990 BYU L. REV. 949, 971 (1990).
39. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 211.
40. Id.
41. See generally David C. Sobelsohn, “Pure” vs. “Modified” Comparative Fault:
Notes on the Debate, 34 EMORY L.J. 65 (1985).
42. Cary, supra note 17, at 282.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Contributory Negligence, supra note 37, at 2–3 (Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
and Washington).
47. Cary, supra note 17, at 282. Courts have given other reasons for adopting modified
comparative fault. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that
the pure comparative negligence rule makes potential plaintiffs out of all parties whose fault
contributed to an accident and that the rule favors the party who incurred the most damages,
even if that party is apportioned a greater percentage of fault. Bradley v. Appalachian Power
Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W. Va. 1979).
48. Contributory Negligence, supra note 37, at 3.
49. Id. In addition, South Dakota recognizes a form of modified comparative fault in
which the fault of the plaintiff and defendant is only compared if the plaintiff’s negligence is
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was less than 50% at fault before recovery is permitted.50 In 22 states, the
bar is set at 51%, so the plaintiff cannot recover if he is apportioned 51% or
more of the fault.51 In all 33 states following the modified contributory fault
rule, if the plaintiff’s percentage of fault falls below the relevant
percentage, he is not barred from recovering.52 Therefore, this modified rule
can be seen as a compromise between traditional contributory negligence
and pure comparative fault, in that it only imposes a complete bar to
recovery if the plaintiff is equally or more at fault than the defendant.53 The
goal of compensating the plaintiff is balanced with the competing goal of
deterring negligence on the part of the plaintiff.54
Most lawmakers and scholars agree that comparative fault has
positively changed tort law and recognize that comparative fault alleviates
the harsh results of the traditional contributory negligence rule.55 It should
also be noted that courts and legislatures did not only consider fairness to
plaintiffs when moving toward a system of comparative fault, but also
fairness to defendants or any other wrongdoers. The specific reasons for the
shift vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the underlying
philosophy is this: “each wrongdoer should pay for his or her own fault, no
more and no less.”56
2. Joint and Several Liability
With the widespread acceptance of comparative fault principles
came challenges to the common law doctrine of joint and several liability.57
Joint and several liability comes into play when multiple defendants are
“slight” and the defendant’s is “gross.” Id. at 6. If the factfinder determines that the
plaintiff’s negligence is more that “slight,” the plaintiff is barred from recovery. Id.
50. Id. at 3 (Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia).
51. Id. at 4 (Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Cary, supra note 17, at 282.
54. Id.
55. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 1, § 1:2.
56. Id. For example, in moving to a modified comparative fault system, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee stated:
Our adoption of comparative fault is due largely to considerations of
fairness: the contributory negligence doctrine unjustly allowed the entire
loss to be borne by a negligent plaintiff, notwithstanding that the plaintiff’s
fault was minor in comparison to defendant’s . . . Further, because a
particular defendant will henceforth be liable only for the percentage of a
plaintiff’s damages occasioned by that defendant’s negligence, situations
where a defendant has paid more than his “share” of a judgment will no
longer arise.
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992).
57. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 223.
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responsible for a single, indivisible harm to a plaintiff, and the loss must be
apportioned between them.58 Traditionally the legal response to joint
tortfeasors was to hold each responsible for the entire indivisible harm.59
Under this system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff may recover all of
the damages for an injury from any individual defendant who is partially at
fault, and the joint tortfeasors can typically be sued together or separately.60
Therefore the risk of insolvency of one or more defendants and the burden
of identifying additional tortfeasors is placed on the defendants, rather than
on the plaintiff.61 This traditional rule of joint and several liability, often
called pure joint and several liability, is still followed in eight
jurisdictions.62
However, since the advent of comparative fault and the move away
from the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence, the pure system of
joint and several liability has also been modified or thrown out altogether in
the majority of jurisdictions, giving way to several liability.63 Several
liability describes a system of apportionment wherein each defendant is
liable to the plaintiff only for the share of damages attributable to that
defendant’s negligence, placing the burden of identifying additional
tortfeasors and the risk of insolvency on the plaintiff.64 This is known as
pure several liability, and is the practice in 14 states.65 Rather than fully
shift that burden to the plaintiff, 28 states have adopted a modified version
of the traditional joint and several liability rule.66 These jurisdictions that
recognize a modified rule typically only allow a defendant whose fault is
above a certain threshold to be responsible for the entire loss.67
States that follow the modern trend of moving away from joint and
several liability rely on the principle that it is possible and desirable to
apportion loss among multiple parties and propose that the principles of
comparative fault used to allocate fault between a plaintiff and defendant
can also work for allocating fault between two or more defendants.68 By
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Joint and Several Liability and Contribution Laws in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN,
WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C. 2 (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mwl-law.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/contribution-actions-in-all-50-states.pdf [perma.cc/CKG7-E7RJ].
61. Id.
62. Id. (Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Virginia).
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 225.
64. Joint and Several, supra note 60, at 2.
65. Id. (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming).
66. Id. (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
67. Id.
68. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 225.
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infusing the justification for comparative fault into the context of a suit
against multiple defendants, these jurisdictions recognize that each party,
including all plaintiffs and defendants, should only be held responsible for
the consequences of his or her own actions.69
3. Contribution
Recognition of comparative fault principles also led to
dissatisfaction with the traditional common law rule of disallowing
contribution.70 Contribution is a claim brought by one joint tortfeasor
against another to recover all or part of the damages the first owes to an
injured plaintiff.71 The rule denying contribution among tortfeasors
originally flowed from the idea that the law will not lend its hand in aid of a
wrongdoer, so one defendant that had partially or fully compensated a
plaintiff was not permitted to use the courts to obtain contribution from
another defendant.72 Therefore, at common law, a defendant could not only
potentially be held responsible for the full amount of damages under the
doctrine of joint and several liability, but could also be precluded from
filing a separate action to recover from a joint tortfeasor.73
Although the common law no-contribution rule was widely
accepted and applied for many years, it was also criticized, especially in
light of the growing acceptance of comparative fault principles in the late
1960s and early 1970s.74 A rule that allowed a plaintiff to attach full
liability to a defendant with deep pockets even if his percentage of fault for
the harm was minimal eventually became too difficult to justify.75 Today
most states have created, either by statute or judicial decision, a right to
bring a contribution suit when two or more tortfeasors are jointly or
severally liable for the same injury.76 The right exists when a tortfeasor has
paid in excess of his pro rata share of the common liability.77 The tortfeasor
has the option to claim contribution in the original lawsuit by filing a crossclaim against a co-defendant or impleading a new party.78 There is also the
option of seeking contribution in a separate lawsuit.79

69. Id.
70. Id. at 231.
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 231.
75. Id.
76. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 7 (1982).
However, the rule of no-contribution remains unchanged for intentional tortfeasors. EPSTEIN,
supra note 14, at 231.
77. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION, supra note 76.
78. Joint and Several, supra note 60, at 2.
79. Id.
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4. Immunities
Yet another area of tort liability in which comparative fault
principles created complications is that of immunity. In raising an immunity
defense, a defendant asserts that he should escape liability for his conduct
because of his status or relationship to the plaintiff.80 Exemption from tort
liability must be justified by compelling policy aims, and each established
immunity is justified for different reasons.81 As discussed in the following
section, the issue of immunity arises most frequently when employers
provide employees benefits through workers’ compensation and, thus, are
generally immune to tort liability.82 Because the practical result of granting
immunities is that the plaintiff is not compensated for harm suffered, the
law generally favors limiting the availability of immunities.83
When more than one individual causes a plaintiff’s harm, but one
of those individuals is immune from liability, the jury is required to
compare the entire fault that is the cause of the harm, including the fault of
the immune individual.84 So not only must courts decide whether juries
should apportion fault to tortfeasors not joined as parties because they
cannot be located or are insolvent, but courts must also determine whether
fault should be apportioned to those who have established their immunity.85
Many courts have held that the negligence of immune parties must be
considered in determining the fault percentages of other tortfeasors, but
statutes in several states provide that the negligence of non-parties is not to
be compared.86 In jurisdictions recognizing principles of comparative fault,
if the fault of an immune party is considered, it will reduce the amount of
fault that can be assigned to the defendant and the plaintiff’s recovery.87
B. The Workers’ Compensation “Bargain”
All states have some sort of workers’ compensation statute, which
is meant to wholly substitute the tort system whenever an employee is
injured in the course of employment.88 States began to pass workers’
compensation laws in the early part of the 20th century in response to the
great difficulty employees faced in recovering tort damages for workplace
injuries among other things.89 Before workers’ compensation laws
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 611.
Id. at 612.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 20, § 495.
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 15, 240.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 20, § 495.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JOHN P. LUDINGTON & CLARK BOARDMAN CALLAGHAN, MODERN WORKERS
COMPENSATION § 102:1 (1993).
89. Klein, supra note 3, at 69.
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intervened, employees would file suit only to be met with various defenses
that they were unlikely to overcome, such as the fellow servant rule,
voluntary assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence.90 Most were
not even able to secure representation.91 The early founders of workers’
compensation law stressed the importance of avoiding the uncertainties and
complications of litigation and substituting simple remedies.92
Under modern state workers’ compensation statutes, employees are
able to recover even when a tort suit likely would fail because an
employee’s right to compensation depends solely on whether or not the
employee suffered a work-related injury, so negligence and fault are
essentially immaterial.93 Thus, even if the employer was not remotely at
fault, liability is not extinguished, and even if the injured employee is
partially to blame for his own injury, his right to contribution is not
affected.94
But, of course, in exchange for this benefit there is a tradeoff. All
states have exclusive remedy provisions, which serve as part of the quid pro
quo by making workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for the
employee’s injury once the act becomes applicable.95 Whether the act
becomes applicable through compulsion or, in some states, by election, an
injured employee no longer has the right to sue the employer in tort or
otherwise recover compensation.96 In addition, a majority of states also bar
an injured employee from bringing a negligence action against a coworker
for injuries caused during the course of employment.97 The interests of
employees and employers are supposedly put in balance by relieving the
possibility of a large damage verdict against the employer.98 However,
critics argue that the limited benefits available to employees are insufficient
to make the tradeoff a fair one.99
While exclusive remedy provisions may bar an injured employee
from suing an employer (and generally coworkers) in tort, these provisions
do not prevent an employee from suing others for work accidents, so the
employee retains the right to file a tort action against a third-party
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. LUDINGTON, supra note 88, § 121.09.
93. Id. §§ 1.01, 1.03.
94. Id. § 1.01.
95. Id. § 100.01.
96. Id. § 102:1.
97. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 111.03 (2014). However, intentional
torts by coworkers are typically considered an exception to the exclusive rule. See, e.g., KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (West 2015) (“The exemption from liability given an employer
by this section shall also extend to . . . all employees, officers or directors . . . provided the
exemption . . . shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by
the willful and unprovoked physical aggression of such employee, officer or director.”).
98. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 100.01 (2014).
99. Klein, supra note 3, at 70; LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 100.02
(2014) (“Exclusiveness clauses have consistently been held to be constitutional.”).
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defendant.100 However, under the typical workers’ compensation statute, the
employer (or the employer’s insurance carrier) is then permitted to seek
subrogation against the award to recover the compensation paid to the
employee. The proceeds from the tort suit are used to reimburse the
employer and any balance goes to the employee.101 Additionally, a majority
of jurisdictions ban contribution by a third-party defendant against an
employer, which means third-party defendants are not allowed to sue or
join a concurrently negligent employer as a joint tortfeasor when the
employer’s negligence was also to blame for the injury.102 The theory
behind this rule is that the employer is not jointly liable to the employee in
tort because of the exclusive remedy provision and therefore is not jointly
liable.103
II. EXISTING APPROACHES
When an injured employee receives workers’ compensation
benefits and decides to sue a third party who also contributed to the
employee’s injury, litigation often ends with a troublesome result: the
blameworthy employer is able to profit by reimbursement of its
compensation expenditures. Although there is general agreement among
scholars that the adoption of comparative fault principles has been a
positive development, states have struggled with determining how those
principles should affect other areas of the law, such as here. Though there is
a clear majority view regarding how to treat such situations, a number of
alternative approaches have immerged, including the “California–North
Carolina approach,” the “New York approach,” and the “Minnesota
approach.”
A. The Majority Approach: No Fault Allocation and No Contribution
In most jurisdictions, a third-party defendant cannot raise a defense
that the employer’s negligence contributed to an employee’s injury, and the
employer may not be assigned a percentage of comparative
responsibility.104 The rationale behind this majority approach is that fault
may be attributed only to those persons against whom the plaintiff has a
cause of action in tort, and the plaintiff does not have a cause of action
against an immune employer or co-employee.105 Rejecting an argument that
fault should be assigned to an immune employer, one court noted:
100. Klein, supra note 3, at 66.
101. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2014).
102. Id. § 121.02.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 120.02[3]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § C20(a)(ii) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
105. JOHN A. DAY ET AL., TENN. PRAC. TENNESSEE LAW OF COMPARATIVE FAULT § 5:11
(2d ed. 2002). However, it should be noted that defendants in such third-party actions still

272

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3: 259

[P]laintiffs would be subject to a double reduction of their
recovery against third parties who contributed to their onthe-job injuries. The first reduction would occur when the
jury apportioned fault to the employer. The second would
occur when the workers’ compensation insurance carrier
exercised its right to subrogation against the plaintiff’s
recovery from the third party.106
The majority rule is also justified by the theory that the cause of action is
the employee’s, and therefore his full recovery should not be affected by his
employer’s negligence.107
Additionally, any recovery-over by the third-party defendant
against the employer by either contribution or implied indemnity is barred,
and the employer retains its subrogation lien for the full amount it has paid
to the employee against any award or settlement the employee obtains
against the third-party defendant, without regard to the employer’s fault.108
In these jurisdictions, the continued right of subrogation even when the
employer is partially at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries is justified by the
generally accepted rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted double
recovery.109 In these states the injured employee comes out “fully
compensated,” in that the employee ends up with roughly the full amount of
damages received from the third-party defendant and no more.110 Another
justification is that because the employer is not a “tortfeasor,” there is no
common liability with the third-party defendant to allow for a claim for
contribution.111 For these reasons, commentators have deemed the majority
approach a “pro-employer approach” and an “all-or-nothing rule.”112
Returning to the Eddy Employee example above, under the
majority approach, if at trial the jury finds Driver to be at fault for Eddy
Employee’s injuries, no matter what the percentage, then Driver will have
to bear the liability both for his own fault and that of Carl Coworker.
Assuming Eddy prevails at establishing some fault and recovers $200,000,
Employer Co. will be permitted to recover the $20,000 that it paid
have a clear right to introduce evidence of the employer or coworker’s negligent conduct to
argue that it was that conduct alone that was the cause-in-fact of the employee’s injuries.
These third-party defendants can avoid liability by arguing that an employer’s conduct was
so egregious that it essentially became a “superseding cause.”
106. Troup v. Fischer Steel Corp., 236 S.W.3d 143, 147 (Tenn. 2007).
107. Arthur Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers’ Compensation
Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 493 (1982).
108. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09[2][b] (2014).
109. See id.
110. Id. § 121.09[2][e].
111. Thomas A. Eaton, Revisiting the Intersection of Workers’ Compensation and
Product Liability: An Assessment of a Proposed Federal Solution to an Old Problem,
64 TENN. L. REV. 881, 889 (1997).
112. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09[2][b] (2014); DAY ET AL.,
supra note 105, § 5:11.
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previously in workers’ compensation benefits even though its negligent
employee Carl was more at fault than Driver.
B. The California–North Carolina Approach: Reduction of Tort
Recovery
In response to the result of the majority approach, several
jurisdictions have adopted a different approach, either by judicial decision
or by statutory reform, based primarily on the general idea that no one
should profit from his own wrong.113 These jurisdictions allow a third-party
defendant to offer evidence of the concurrent negligence of an employer (or
coworker) as a pro tanto defense, resulting in a direct reduction of the
injured employee’s damage award if the defendant is successful.114 This
general approach varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.115 In North
Carolina, California, Idaho, and Nevada, for example, when the defendant
proves that the employer’s negligence was a contributing factor, the
damage award is reduced by the amount of workers’ compensation benefits
paid to the employee.116 Conversely, in Arizona, Utah, Kansas, and
Louisiana, the recovery is reduced to the extent of the employer’s
proportional fault.117 In most of these jurisdictions, the concurrently
negligent employer can still bring a subrogation claim for the amount by
which the compensation paid exceeded the employer’s proportional share
of fault for the injury.118 However, it appears that at least one jurisdiction
eliminates the employers subrogation entirely if the employer is found to be
concurrently negligent.119
113. Larson, supra note 107, at 493. Eight states follow this general approach (Arizona,
California, North Carolina, Idaho, Nevada, Kansas, Louisiana, and Utah). Contributory
Negligence, supra note 37, at 2–4.
114. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02[3] (2014).
115. Id.
116. Id. See Essick v. City of Lexington, 65 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1951) (“[T]he third party
tort-feasor . . . is entitled to plead contributory negligence on the part of the employer as a
bar to reimbursement pro tanto for the award paid.”); Witt v. Jackson, 366 P.2d 641, 649
(1961) (“[T]he third party tortfeasor should be able to invoke the concurrent negligence of
the employer to defeat its right of reimbursement . . . to the extent that compensation
benefits have been paid to the employee.”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 417 P.2d 417,
422–23 (1966) (indicating that Idaho intends to follow California’s Witt rule); Santisteven v.
Dow Chem. Co., 362 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Nev. 1973) (cited with approval by the Supreme
Court of Nevada in Kellen v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 642 P.2d 600, 601 n.1 (1982)).
117. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02 (2014). See Dietz v. General
Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166, 172 (1991) (“When an employer negligently contributes to an
employee’s injury, the joint tortfeasors may require the employer’s negligence to be
considered for the assessment of fault.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(4) (LexisNexis
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44–504(d) (2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010).
118. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02 (2014).
119. See Santisteven, 362 F. Supp. at 651 (“If the jury determines that concurring
negligence or actionable conduct of [the third party] and [the employer] caused plaintiff’s
injuries, the Industrial Commission’s right of subrogation will be eliminated and the amount
of plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by the amount of compensation paid or to be paid.”).
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Using the Eddy Employee example, if the accident occurred in
North Carolina, California, Idaho, or Nevada, Eddy’s $200,000 verdict
would be reduced by the $20,000 that Employer Co. paid him in workers’
compensation benefits.120 The jury would be permitted to allocate fault to
Driver and to Carl; however, Driver would be responsible for the remaining
$180,000 regardless of the result. The percentages determined by the jury
would only be used to calculate the amount for which Employer Co. is
entitled to reimbursement. Assuming that Carl was more at fault than
Driver, Employer Co. would not be able to receive reimbursement because
the compensation paid would not exceed Carl’s proportional share of fault.
Under the modified version of the approach followed in Arizona,
Utah, Kansas, and Louisiana, the jury would be permitted to allocate fault
to Driver and to Carl. Suppose the jury determined that Driver was 25% at
fault, while Carl was determined to be 75% at fault. In Eddy’s suit against
Driver, Driver would be responsible for $50,000 of the total damage award
of $200,000. Employer Co. or its insurance carrier would not be permitted
to recover in subrogation because the amount of workers’ compensation
benefits paid, $20,000, did not exceed Carl’s proportional share of fault.
However, to change the facts, suppose the jury first determined that Eddy
had suffered $100,000 in damages, and Employer Co. had already paid
Eddy $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. Also assume the jury
determined that Carl was only 10% at fault, while Driver was 90% at fault.
In this situation, Driver would be responsible for $90,000 of the damage
award, and Employer Co. would be able to seek reimbursement for
$10,000, the amount that exceeded Carl’s proportional share of fault.
C. The New York Approach: Contribution Proportionate to Fault
New York has addressed the dilemma by allowing third-party
defendants to seek contribution from negligent employers based on the
employer’s proportion of fault, while retaining the employer’s right of
subrogation.121 The New York courts fashioned a rule that goes the furthest
in protecting the interests of third-party defendants, providing unlimited
recovery-over.122 In New York, the employee recovers workers’
121. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1998). Today, only New York follows this approach,
and even there, the rule’s application has been limited. Illinois previously allowed
proportional contribution. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co.,
374 N.E.2d 437, 442–43 (Ill. 1977).
122. Larson, supra note 107, at 536; Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 282 N.E.2d 288, 295
(N.Y. 1972) (holding that the third-party defendant in a suit by the employee’s widow could
implead the partially responsible employer and an amount proportionate to the employer’s
share of fault); see also LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[8] (2014)
(explaining that New York’s rule was accomplished by creating an implied contract of
indemnity in favor of any tortfeasor by any other tortfeasor, rather than a traditional
contribution right).
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compensation benefits from the employer, full tort damages from the thirdparty defendant, and reimburses the employer for compensation benefits
received out of the damages award.123 The defendant then receives
contribution from the employer proportionate to the employer’s fault.124
Therefore, the liability of the employer and the third-party
defendant is ultimately proportioned to their relative fault, and the
employee is left fully compensated.125 Generally this approach led to
employers paying only slightly more to an injured employee than it would
have under the typical workers’ compensation award,126 but one can
imagine circumstances under which the employer would pay substantially
more than its typical limited liability, particularly when the damages
awarded are high and the employer is allocated a large percentage of fault.
This led the New York legislature to limit the rule’s application to allow
employer liability for contribution or indemnity only when the employee
has suffered a “grave injury.”127
Changing the facts in the Eddy Employee example illustrates the
typical outcome under the New York approach. Suppose that Eddy suffered
a “grave injury,” such as the loss of a limb,128 that the total damage award
was $20,000, and that Eddy received $9,000 in benefits from Employer Co.
If the jury assigns 60% of the fault to Carl Coworker and 40% of the fault
to Driver, Eddy would recover the full $20,000 award from Driver, but
Driver is entitled to seek contribution from Employer Co. for $12,000,
which reflects the percentage of Carl’s fault. Additionally, Employer Co.
retains its subrogation right, and is entitled to $9,000 of Eddy’s tort award,
preventing Eddy’s double recovery. Therefore, Eddy is left fully
compensated, receiving the full tort award of $20,000. Driver eventually
pays only $8,000, calculated in relation to his fault, and Employer Co.
eventually pays $12,000, in relation to its fault (via Carl Coworker).
Although Employer Co. is saddled with a payment higher than it would
have typically been responsible for under the exclusive remedy rule, the
difference between $9,000 and $12,000 is not extreme.
123. Eaton, supra note 111, at 890.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[8] (2014).
127. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2013) (defining grave injury to
include death, loss of certain extremities, blindness, deafness, certain facial injuries, certain
brain injuries, and paraplegia or quadriplegia); McCluskey, supra note 121, at 905; see
LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[8] (2014) (“One interesting bit of
irony—the third-party defendant is left with an uncomfortable need to double-speak. It is
generally in the best interests of any defendant to argue that the employee’s injuries are not
severe, so as to minimize the resulting verdict, but on the other hand, the third-party
defendant may only look to the New York employer for contribution/indemnity if the
employee’s injuries are characterized as ‘grave.’”).
128. For the loss of an extremity to be considered grave, it must be “permanent and
total loss of use or amputation of an arm, leg, hand or foot, loss of multiple fingers, [or] loss
of multiple toes.” N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §!11 (McKinney 2013).
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Yet, consider how the example case would play out under the
original facts. Eddy suffered a “grave injury,” and he received a $200,000
verdict and $20,000 in benefits. The jury determined that Driver was 25%
at fault and Carl was 75% at fault. Again, Eddy is left fully compensated,
receiving the full $200,000 tort award. However, after contribution and
subrogation rights are exercised, Driver will have paid $50,000, and
Employer Co. will have paid $150,000. Consequently, the portion of the
total $200,000 award paid by Employer Co. greatly exceeds the limited
benefits that it would ordinarily expect to pay to an injured employee.
D. The Minnesota Approach: Limited Contribution
Minnesota’s Supreme Court, recognizing the problems with New
York’s approach, sought to balance the policies in favor of comparative
fault and those in favor of workers’ compensation exclusive remedy
provisions.129 The Minnesota approach, like the New York rule, allows the
injured employee to receive his full tort award from the third-party
defendant but also allows contribution by the employer in proportion to its
fault.130 But Minnesota places a ceiling on the employer’s liability in the
amount of its workers’ compensation obligation.131 The employer also
retains its subrogation right.132 In adopting this approach, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota relied on the concept that contribution is an equitable
doctrine.133 It conceded the lack of common liability, which is ordinarily
required to support contribution, between a third-party defendant and
employer, but the court concluded that the concept should not prevent an
equitable result.134 The approach is also consistant with the workers’
compensation policy of limited liability for employers, in that the employer
129. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[5] (2014); Lambertson v.
Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 passim (1977). The Minnesota rule was adopted from a
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Lambertson, 257 N.W.2d at 689; Maio v.
Fahs,14 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1940), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 5, 1974, No. 263, sec. 6,
§ 303(b), 1974 Pa. Laws 782, 787, as recognized in Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 412 A.2d 1094, 1096 (1980).
130. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[5] (2014).
131. Klein, supra note 3, at 75. Kentucky and Illinois also appear to follow this general
approach. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (West 2015) (“The liability of an employer to
another person who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of [the workrelated injury or death of an employee] caused by a breach of any duty or obligation owed
by such employer to such other shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other
benefits for which such employer is liable.”); Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp.,
585 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. 1991) (“We find that the Minnesota rule provides the fairest and
most equitable balance between the competing interests of the employer and the third-party
defendant.”).
132. Klein, supra note 3, at 75.
133. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[5] (2014); Lambertson,
257 N.W.2d at 689.
134. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[5] (2014). Lambertson,
257 N.W.2d at 689.
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pays out no more than it expected to under the compensation act.135 For
these reasons, this approach is often considered a compromise between the
policies underlying the workers’ compensation and tort systems.136
Using the Minnesota rule, the litigation would play out much as it
would under the New York approach. Eddy will be able to recover the full
$200,000 from Driver, and Driver is permitted to seek contribution from
Employer Co. But because Employer Co. cannot be forced to contribute
beyond its workers’ compensation liability, Driver will only be able to
recover $20,000 from Employer Co. Employer Co. will then exercise its
subrogation right against Eddy’s tort award. Therefore, Driver, who was
25% at fault, eventually pays $180,000 and Employer Co., responsible for
Carl’s 75% of fault, pays $20,000, amounts that are undoubtedly not in
proportion to their relative fault.
Nevertheless, under a different set of facts, the result under the
Minnesota approach might not seem as severe. Assuming Eddy received a
$20,000 verdict and $9,000 in benefits and that Carl and Driver were each
50% at fault, Driver would be permitted to recover $9,000 from Employer
Co. Although Driver would be left paying $11,000, which is still in excess
of his proportion of fault, the result is much closer to being proportionate
under these facts.
III. VARIOUS SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE DELIMMA
In addition to legislatures and courts, commentators and scholars
have weighed in on the discussion to propose solutions to the problem of
meshing workers’ compensation and tort law. Although none of these
approaches have been adopted in any jurisdiction, these proposals have
gained differing levels of support in the legal field. The most prevalent of
these approaches include (1) abolishment of suits against third parties, (2) a
separation of workers’ compensation and tort systems, (3) the “Murray
Credit” rule, (4) a proposal by Professor Clifford Davis, (5) a proposal by
Professor Arthur Larson, and (6) a proposal by Professor Andrew R. Klein.
A. Abolish Third Party Suits
Often considered the most extreme approach, some have advocated
for the complete elimination of third-party lawsuits.137 Such scholars have
135. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.03[5] (2014).
136. Eaton, supra note 111, at 892.
137. Klein, supra note 3, at 78; See, e.g., Merton C. Bernstein, Third Party Claims in
Workers’ Compensation: A Proposal to Do More with Less, 1977 WASH. U. L. Q. 543, 556
(1977); Jeffrey O’Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An Answer
to Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 435, 441 (1976). The abolition of third-party actions was also the program of the
“Special Committee on Workplace Liability Reform,” formed in 1977 and headed by former
Senator Taft. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW §!121.09[2][e] (2014).
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argued, in various forms, that a system for improving compensation
benefits received by the employee in the event of a workplace injury should
be put in place, eliminating the need for third-party suits.138 Some
proponents support the idea of complete abolition of such suits, but under
one theory, the employer, not the employee, would be given the chance to
negotiate or litigate for reimbursement from third parties who might
otherwise be liable in tort.139
Considering the Eddy Employee example, the obvious result if
third-party suits were abolished would be that Eddy’s only recovery would
come from workers’ compensation benefits. Although the difference might
be less pronounced under a different set of facts, the difference in Eddy’s
case, a $200,000 tort award versus $20,000 in benefits, would be
particularly drastic. This is the result assuming that the workers’
compensation system is not improved.
B. Completely Separate Workers’ Compensation and Tort Systems
Some academics have supported the idea of a complete separation
of workers’ compensation and tort systems.140 Such an approach would
limit the third-party defendant’s liability to his proportional share of fault
and eliminate the employer’s right of subrogation.141 This proposal would
serve the defendant’s interest in proportional liability and the employer’s
interest in limited liability, but, in contrast to all of the existing approaches
to the dilemma, it is likely that the injured employee would not be fully
compensated.142
Under this complete separation approach, Eddy Employee would
not receive full compensation. Assume Eddy received a $200,000 verdict
and $20,000 in benefits and that the jury found Driver to be 25% at fault
and Carl to be 75% at fault. Driver’s damages would be reduced to $50,000
in proportion to his relative fault. Therefore, taking into account the
workers’ compensation benefits paid by Employer Co., Eddy would receive
$70,000 of the $200,000 that it would take to place him back in his rightful
position according to the jury.
Nevertheless, Eddy could be fully compensated under this approach
if a different set of facts is considered. Assume that Eddy received a
$20,000 verdict and $9,000 in benefits, but this time, Carl was 40% at fault
and Driver was 60% at fault. Driver’s damages would then be reduced to
138. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09[2][e] (2014).
139. Jeffrey O’Connell, Supplementing Workers’ Compensation Benefits in Return for
an Assignment of Third-Party Tort Claims–Without an Enabling Statute, 56 TEX. L. REV.
537, 542 (1978).
140. Eaton, supra note 111, at 894; Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ Compensation and
Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825,
845 (1989).
141. Eaton, supra note 111, at 894.
142. Id.
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$12,000, proportionate to his fault. Consequently, Eddy would actually be
over-compensated, receiving $21,000 from the combination of the tort
award and the workers’ compensation benefits.
C. The “Murray Credit” Rule
Some commentators have recognized a potential solution to the
problem using the holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in the case of Murray v. United States,143 which involved a
government employee who was injured on the job.144 In the employee’s suit
against a concurrently negligent third-party defendant, the court
acknowledged that because the government was the employer, it had
immunity; however, rather than placing full responsibility for the tort
damages on the defendant, the court viewed the government as a party that
had settled its dispute with the injured employee.145 In doing such, it
triggered the rule that
“where one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises
the claim, the other tortfeasor, though unable to obtain
contribution because the settling tortfeasor had ‘bought his
peace,’ is nonetheless protected by having his tort
judgment reduced by one-half, on the theory that one-half
of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the
settlement . . . . The Murray rule, therefore, allows the
third-party a per capita credit based on the employer’s
contribution to the injury.”146
Thus, if this rule was implemented, third-party recovery would
simply be reduced by half if the employer was found to be negligent, and
the employer would still retain its subrogation right.147
Returning to the example case, under the “Murray Credit” rule,
allocation of fault is not necessary. If Carl Coworker is found to be partially
to blame, the damage award would be cut in half, and Driver would be
responsible for $100,000 of the $200,000 in damages. Moreover, Employer
Co. is entitled to exercise its subrogation right and recover the $20,000 paid
in benefits. This leaves Eddy with a total recovery of compensation plus
damages of only $80,000, even though at trial Eddy presumably established
actual damages of $200,000.

143. Klein, supra note 3, at 76.
144. Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
145. Id. at 1364–65.
146. Id. at 1365.
147. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09[2][e] (2014).
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D. Professor Clifford Davis’s Proposal
Professor Clifford Davis proposed a unique solution to the dilemma
as early as 1976.148 He asserted that in a suit between an employee and a
third-party defendant, the percentage of fault of the employer and defendant
should first be calculated.149 This percentage would then be applied to the
damage award, so the third-party defendant would be liable for the damage
verdict multiplied by the defendant’s percentage of fault.150 When the
employer exercises its subrogation right, the employer’s recovery from the
plaintiff would be reduced according to its percentage of fault.151 An
employer found to be 10% at fault for an employee’s injury, therefore,
would have its subrogation recovery reduced by 10%.152 This approach
increases the use of comparative fault principles in assessing employer
liability.153
Recall that in the Eddy Employee example the jury found Driver to
be 25% at fault and Carl Coworker to be 75% at fault. Under Professor
Davis’s approach, Eddy would receive $50,000, or 25% of the $200,000
verdict, from Driver. Employer Co. would retain its subrogation right, but
the $20,000 it paid in workers’ compensation benefits would be reduced by
75%, Carl’s percentage of fault, to $5,000. Thus, Employer Co. would
recover $5,000 from Eddy, and Eddy would be left with $45,000 of the
$200,000 verdict.
E. Professor Arthur Larson’s Proposal
In 1982, Professor Arthur Larson first suggested an approach that
he described as an adaptation of the North Carolina-California approach,
which he considered to be too complex.154 He sought to create an approach
that would “achieve maximum simplicity without, perhaps, too shocking a
departure from equity.”155 Under Professor Larson’s approach, the
employee’s recovery from the third-party defendant would be reduced by
the amount of workers’ compensation benefits received.156 This reduction
would occur in all cases, not just in those involving employer negligence.157
Next, subrogation by the employer would be abolished in all cases because
148. Clifford Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors’ Rights Where Compensation-Covered
Employers Are Negligent—Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571
(1976).
149. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09[2][e] (2014).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Klein, supra note 3, at 78.
154. Larson, supra note 107, at 540.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the employee would not be fully compensated by the third-party
defendant.158 All recovery-over by the third-party defendant would also be
abolished.159 Thus, under this approach, the employee comes out with full
damages, and the defendant’s liability is reduced, though not in proportion
to fault.160 The employer is left without opportunity for reimbursement
through subrogation but is protected from contribution claims by the thirdparty defendant.161
This proposed solution achieves Professor Larson’s goal of
simplicity, but opinions on the fairness of the result might depend on the
particular facts of the case. Consider the Eddy Employee example with the
original facts. Driver’s liability would be decreased by $20,000, the amount
of workers’ compensation benefits paid, from $200,000 to $180,000. This
result seems unjust from Driver’s perspective, given that Carl Coworker
was 75% at fault.
However, suppose Eddy received $20,000 in benefits but only a
$50,000 verdict. Also assume that Driver was 80% at fault and Carl was
only 20% at fault. Under these facts, Driver’s liability would be reduced to
$30,000, which is less than his percentage of fault. Here, the result, while
obviously more appealing to Driver, is that Employer Co. would pay
greater than its percentage of fault through workers’ compensation benefits
and would be left without a subrogation right.
F. Professor Andrew R. Klein’s Proposal
More recently, Professor Andrew R. Klein made a proposal, which
would treat the payment of workers’ compensation benefits as a settlement
and limit the third-party defendant’s tort liability according to comparative
fault principles.162 Treating a workers’ compensation payment as a
settlement between the injured employee and the employer would eliminate
the employer’s subrogation rights.163 According to Professor Klein, there is
no reason to alter this “settlement” by giving the employer a right to
subrogation or by ignoring the limited liability rule and giving the plaintiff
additional payment.164 He expressed great concern with importing
comparative fault principles into the workers’ compensation system
because doing so would violate the core workers’ compensation principle of
limited liability.165

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Arthur Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers’ Compensation
Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 493 (1982).
161. Id.
162. Klein, supra note 3, at 81.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 81–82.
165. Id. at 79.
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Applying Professor Klein’s approach, Eddy Employee might come
out over-compensated or under-compensated, depending on the particular
facts. Under the original facts, Eddy would receive $50,000, or 25% of the
$200,000 verdict, in damages from Driver. The $20,000 that Eddy received
in benefits from Employer Co. would be treated as a settlement. Therefore,
Eddy would retain $70,000 from the combined tort award and workers’
compensation benefits, leaving him significantly undercompensated.
Yet, consider a situation in which Eddy suffered $50,000 in
damages and received $10,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. Suppose
Driver was 90% at fault and Carl was only 10% at fault. Eddy would
recover $45,000 from driver and retain the $10,000 in benefits, leaving
Eddy over-compensated by $5,000. He would retain $55,000 total, when he
only suffered $50,000 in damages.
IV. AUTHOR’S PROPOSED SOLUTION
As stated by Professor Klein, “Ideally, a scholarly proposal should
mesh tort law and workers’ compensation while respecting the essential
components of both systems.”166 The problem is that these two systems of
law cannot be meshed perfectly. The tort concepts of ensuring that each
party is not taxed with any liability for an injury beyond the extent of his
actual fault and an injured party’s right to compensation are simply
inconsistent with the no-fault system created by the employee–employer
bargain in workers’ compensation law.167 Professor Larson has long
described the problem as the “most evenly balanced controversy” for which
one of the three parties’ interests will always be favored over the others.168
A. The New Approach
While agreeing that a solution is in order, this note favors a slightly
different, and perhaps unconventional, solution to the dilemma. This new
approach seeks to account, in part, for the interests of all three parties, while
still recognizing principles of comparative fault and respecting the
employee–employer workers’ compensation bargain. Under this approach,
the damage verdict would initially be reduced by the amount of workers’
compensation benefits received by the injured employee. The jury would be
permitted to allocate fault between the third-party defendant and the
employer, and rather than permitting contribution, the defendant’s liability
would be reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault. Any portion of
the total damage verdict that remained unaccounted for would then be
divided equally between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant.
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Additionally, the employer’s subrogation right would be eliminated upon a
finding that the employer (or a coworker) was partially at fault.
Depending on the particular facts of the case, the burden of inequity
would fall on a different party. Returning to the Eddy Employee example,
under this new approach, the $200,000 damage verdict would be reduced
by the $20,000 in workers’ compensation benefits paid by Employer Co.,
leaving it at $180,000. Driver’s liability would initially be reduced to
$50,000 because Driver was found to be 25% at fault. To make Eddy
whole, the $130,000 difference between Driver’s liability and workers’
compensation benefits would then be split between Driver and Eddy. In
effect, this would increase Driver’s liability to $115,000 ($50,000 plus half
of the $130,000 difference). In this scenario, Eddy does not come out fully
compensated and Driver pays in excess of his relative percentage of fault.
Consider, however, a different set of facts. Suppose the total
damage award was $20,000, and Eddy received $9,000 in benefits from
Employer Co. Assume the jury determines that Carl Coworker was 40% at
fault and Driver was 60% at fault. After the damage verdict is reduced by
the compensation benefits, it is left at $11,000. Ordinarily, Driver’s liability
would be reduced to $12,000 in proportion to his fault; however, Driver
would only be liable for $11,000 under these facts, the portion of the
verdict remaining. Although Employer Co. paid $9,000 in benefits, which is
greater that its relative percentage of fault, it is left without a right to
recover the amount it paid in excess through subrogation. Therefore, under
this scenario, Employer Co. bears the burden of inequity.
B. Comparison to Existing Approaches and Other Suggested Solutions
The new approach seeks to improve upon the various issues created
by the existing approaches. First, consider the majority approach, which
scholars, judges, lawyers, and other commentators have heavily criticized
for many years.169 Under the majority approach, the third-party defendant,
the only party that was not a part of the statutory workers’ compensation
arrangement, bears the burden of inequity created by the workers’
compensation bargain.170 Additionally, this approach “potentially leaves the
third-party defendant bearing more than its actual share of the loss in a state
that is supposed to apportion liability in accordance with fault.”171 Another
noteworthy problem is that the majority approach can be confusing to
juries, particularly when the third-party defendant offers convincing
evidence of the employer’s fault at trial in attempt to establish that the
employer was the cause of the employee’s injury, as the defendant is
permitted to do. If it is clear that both the employer and the third-party
defendant are each an actual cause of the injury, the jury is then instructed
169. See generally LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 121.09 (2014).
170. See Klein, supra note 3, at 71.
171. Id. at 73.
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that fault can only be apportioned between the defendant and the plaintiff,
potentially leading juries to attempt to manipulate a “fair” result.172
In contrast, the new approach avoids placing the entire burden of
inequity created by the workers’ compensation bargain on the third-party
defendant by instead requiring the injured employee and the employer to
share in the risk. Also, rather than removing the issue of the employer’s
liability from the jury, the new approach allows the jury to allocate fault to
the employer. This also eliminates the jury manipulation problem because
the calculations would be conducted by the court after the jury allocates
fault to the parties.
Next, consider the California-North Carolina approach, which
several states have presumably adopted in attempt to alleviate the harsh
results achieved by the majority approach. Although this approach purports
to achieve a similar outcome as limited contribution but by avoiding the
complicated motion process, the California-North Carolina approach has
come to be known as a complex one that requires involvement of all three
parties and that leaves courts struggling to decide multifaceted problems on
a case-by-case basis.173 It also leaves too much room for manipulation of
the outcome by the parties through settlement.174 For these reasons, several
jurisdictions have deliberately declined to follow this approach.175
Conversely, by eliminating subrogation claims by the employer
when it or an employee is found to be partially at fault, the new approach
ensures that the damage suit will only involve the injured employee and the
third-party defendant. Because the employer’s interests are not affected by
the outcome of the suit, the employer is unlikely to involve itself in the
proceedings. In addition, in states where an employer is prevented from
exercising its subrogation right against injured employee’s settlement with
a third party, the problem of the employee attempting to manipulate the
result through settlement is avoided. Under the new approach, there would
172. See DAY ET AL., supra note 105, § 5:11 (2d ed. 2002) (“Jurors can be expected to
struggle with the notion that conduct of the employer they deem to be a cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries cannot be allocated as fault to the nonparty employer. One can imagine
situations in which the jury will shift that ‘fault’ to the defendant or the plaintiff, or divide it
somehow between them. One can also imagine situations in which they jury will not assign
fault to either the defendant or the plaintiff rather than sticking one party or the other with
the percentage of fault the jury wanted to allocate to the employer.”).
173. LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 120.02[3] (2014) (“Thus, the
employee might, for example, settle his or her damage action before receiving any
compensation benefits. In California, such a settlement is not subject to the employer’s lien.
In addition, the employee can then apply for workers’ compensation benefits, which will be
paid in proportion to the employer’s concurring fault as adjudicated by the Board. If the case
goes to judgment, it is to the employee’s advantage to have received as little compensation
as possible, since the judgment is reduced only by the amount of past compensation actually
paid. By the same token, it may be to the third party’s advantage to delay the damage suit as
long as possible, since the more compensation benefits are actually paid, the more the
judgment is reduced.”).
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not be an added incentive for the injured employee to settle with the thirdparty defendant, as in the California-North Carolina approach, because the
subsequent reimbursement of the employer would not be an issue.
Finally, the New York approach, which allows the third-party
defendant to seek contribution against the employer, has been criticized for
swinging too far in the other direction, creating an inequitable result for the
employer (or the employer’s insurance carrier).176 Under this approach, the
employer does not receive limited liability, the benefit of its bargain with
the injured employee. While principles of comparative fault are observed,
this approach ignores the policies behind the exclusive remedy provision of
its workers’ compensation laws, though now this only occurs when there is
a “grave injury.” Minnesota’s approach, in seeking to improve upon New
York’s rule by capping the employer’s liability up to the amount of
workers’ compensation benefits, did so at the expense of aligning each
party’s liability with its percentage of fault.177 The Minnesota approach can
still result in unfairness to the third-party defendant, especially when the
employer (or coworker) is largely to blame for the employee’s injury.178
The Minnesota approach addresses the New York approach’s
failure to grant the employer limited liability, the most obvious problem
with that approach. However, the Minnesota approach does not address the
fact that the New York approach does not apportion liability among the
parties. In contrast, the new approach addresses both of these problems,
recognizing the employer’s limited liability while still requiring the jury to
allocate fault to the employer.
It is worth noting that each of the existing approaches protects the
injured employee’s interest in full recovery at the expense of the interests of
the third-party defendant, the employer, or both. Interestingly, no state
approach forces the injured employee to bear the risk of undercompensation in its suit against a third-party defendant, when “this is the
same sort of undercompensation that an employee would face without the
fortuity of having a third-party defendant in the case.”179 The proposed
solution seeks to address this problem by spreading the burden of potential
inequity among all three parties involved. This risk of under-compensation
on the part of the plaintiff, or injured employee, and the risk of paying in
excess of fault on the part of the employer can be justified as being a part of
the quid pro quo of the limited liability workers’ compensation bargain.
Placing the entire burden of inequity on the third-party defendant, who was
not a party to the workers’ compensation bargain, is clearly not the fairest
solution; however, it is a fundamental concept of tort law that the defendant
must take the plaintiff as he finds him. Therefore, placing some of the risk
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on the third-party defendant that he will have to pay heightened damages
due to the vulnerability of the particular plaintiff is not unjustified.
In addition to addressing the problems with the existing
approaches, the new approach also seeks to improve upon the various
solutions suggested by scholars. Each of the suggested solutions discussed
herein raise the issue of either over-simplifying or further complicating this
complex dilemma. The elimination of third-party lawsuits, the most oversimplified option, would require a dramatic increase in the benefits
provided to injured employees from employers or other sources,180 and such
a development appears impractical and unlikely. Similarly uncomplicated is
the concept of separating the workers’ compensation and tort systems
entirely by reducing the third-party defendant’s liability in proportion to his
share of fault and eliminating the employer’s subrogation right. But, this
suggested solution places the full burden of inequity on the injured
employee, running the risk of severe undercompensation. Also, under this
complete separation approach, the burden of defending the employer’s
conduct against the third-party defendant would completely fall on the
employee because the employer would have no real stake in the
litigation.181
The new approach improves upon these simplified solutions by
providing a solution that merely requires courts and juries to allocate fault,
a task that courts regularly engage in, rather than requiring a dramatic
change in workers’ compensation schemes. Additionally, the new approach
does not require the injured employee alone to bear the risk of inequity but
allocates the risk among all the parties. Although, under the new approach,
the injured employee would bear the burden of defending the employer’s
conduct in the damage suit, this problem is largely neutralized by the
automatic reduction of the damage award in the amount of workers’
compensation benefits and by the equal division of any portion of the total
damage award not attributed to the third-party defendant’s fault.
It is most concerning that several solutions suggested by scholars
still fail to require allocation of fault to the employer in an injured
employee’s damage suit, while the principles of several liability and
comparative fault effectively compel consideration of the employer’s level
of fault.182 Without considering the employer’s fault, it seems that it would
be nearly impossible for a jury to assign an exact percentage of
responsibility to the third-party defendant or, for that matter, the injured
employee.183 Nevertheless, the “Murray Credit” rule and Professor Larson’s
approach both avoid fault allocation to the employer, instead opting to
automatically reduce the damage award by half or by the amount of
workers’ compensation benefits, respectively. Under the Murray Credit
180. Id.
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rule, the injured employee is likely to come out undercompensated due to
the extreme reduction to the award and the employer’s right to subrogation.
Professor Larson’s approach somewhat addresses this problem by only
reducing the award according the benefits actually paid by the employer
and by eliminating the employer’s subrogation right. But, under both
approaches, liability will rarely reflect the fault of the parties.
The new approach, however, improves upon these suggested
solutions by requiring a fault allocation between all of the parties from the
outset. Although in many cases the ultimate liability born by the employer
and the third-party defendant would not likely be precisely in proportion to
their respective fault, the approach does not favor any one party. As
discussed, depending on the circumstances, either the injured employee, the
immune employer, or the third-party defendant may be forced to accept a
seemingly inequitable result.
Professor Davis’s proposal and Professor Klein’s proposal do in
fact involve allocation of fault, including that of the employer. While
Professor Klein’s proposal only uses the employer’s percentage of fault to
reduce the damage award, Professor Davis’s proposal also uses the
percentage to calculate the amount the employer is permitted to recover
from the injured employee through subrogation. But, because Professor
Davis’s proposal makes the amount an employer can recover in subrogation
dependent on the fault allocation, the employer has a greater stake in the
litigation. Therefore, if this proposal was adopted, it would likely result in
the same complications that have arisen under the California-North
Carolina approach. Professor Klein’s proposal, on the other hand, seems to
be a reasonable solution, but it is unclear how this approach is different, in
effect, from the complete separation approach. Under both approaches, the
damage award is calculated in proportion to the third-party defendant’s
fault and the right to subrogation is eliminated. The only difference seems
to be that Professor Klein conceptualizes the workers’ compensation
payment as a settlement.
The new approach is undoubtedly similar to Professor Davis’s
proposal and Professor Klein’s proposal in that it begins with requiring
fault allocation among the parties and reduces the damage award to reflect
the third-party defendant’s percentage of fault, but it is the new approach’s
departure from these previous proposals that provides the improvement.
The new approach, unlike Professor Davis’s approach, eliminates
subrogation, ensuring that the employer does not become involved and
complicate the damage suit. Also, assuming that the damage award will not
fully compensate the injured employee after being reduced by the amount
of workers’ compensation benefits and by the percentage of the employer’s
fault, the new approach does not require the employee alone to bear the full
loss, as Professor Klein’s proposal would. Instead, the loss is divided
equally between the injured employee and the third-party defendant,
ensuring that each bears the burden of inequity.
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CONCLUSION
Thus, we must conclude on the realistic note that there is no perfect
solution for this “most evenly balanced controversy.” Courts, legislatures,
and scholars have grappled with this problem of how to treat the concurrent
negligence of the employer in the plaintiff’s suit against a third-party
defendant for decades. Endless amounts of research lead to the frustrating
result that it is practically impossible to fully account for all of the interests
involved. However, one thing is sure: under the majority approach,
unfairness to the third-party defendant is obvious. The defendant is held
liable for the full amount of harm, even if his relative percentage of fault
was small, and meanwhile, the negligent employer benefits from avoiding
tort responsibility and retains the right to recover its workers’ compensation
payments through subrogation. This result has become even less justifiable
considering the emergence of comparative fault principles designed to align
liability with fault.
The author’s proposed solution is not a perfect one. Depending on
the facts of the particular case, the interests of at least one of the three
parties will, in part, be ignored. The plaintiff will not always be fully
compensated for his injury, and either the third-party defendant or the
employer will likely be forced to pay in excess of its relative percentage of
fault. The purpose of the solution is to, as equally as possible, spread the
risk of being burdened with inequity among the parties. The new solution
accomplishes that aim by eliminating the employer’s subrogation right
when it is determined to be partially at fault, reducing the damage verdict
by the workers’ compensation benefits paid and in proportion to the thirdparty defendant’s fault, and then dividing any portion of the total damage
verdict that remains unaccounted for between the plaintiff and the thirdparty defendant. Therefore, the solution simultaneously respects the
essential components of both tort law and workers’ compensation.

